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INTRODUCTION 
 
"If you want to destroy someone nowadays, you go after their 
infrastructure" (Agre 2001,  1) 
 
"There is nothing in the world today that cannot become a weapon" 
(Liang and Xiangsui, 1999, 5) 
 
"Real security cannot be cordoned off. It is woven into our most basic 
social fabric. From the post office to the emergency room, from the 
subway to the water reservoir" (Klein, 2001, 21) 
 
The forced demodernisation of cities and urban societies through state infrastructural 
warfare is emerging as a central component of contemporary military strategy.  Largely 
unreported in the popular press, mainstream media, and ‘urban’ research, vast military 
research and development efforts are fuelling a widening range of 'hard' and 'soft' anti-
infrastructure weapons. These are being carefully designed to destroy, or disrupt, the 
multiple, networked infrastructures that together allow cities within modern ‘network 
societies’ to function (Castells, 1996, Graham and Marvin, 2001).  
 
The purpose of this paper is to explore the emerging strategies, doctrines, techniques 
and discourses which surround state-backed warfare deliberately targeting urban 
infrastructure. In doing this, the paper is an attempt to develop a preliminary  and critical 
geopolitics of forced urban demodernisation in the contemporary world. The paper has 
been written as a follow-up to a broader discussion of the intersections of cities and 
geopolitics published in City 8(2). It has four parts. In the first, I attempt to place forced 
urban demodernisation via infrastructural warfare and disconnection within a theoretical 
perspective. This stresses the connections between urban infrastructure, networked 
societies, and contemporary geopolitical power. Second, I briefly analyse two case 
studies of state infrastructural warfare which focus on the leading exponent of forced 
demodernisation as national strategy -- the current global  and military hegemon, the 
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United States. The case studies are the 1999 Kosovo intervention and the experience of 
war, sanctions, and more war in Iraq since 1991. Third, again using the United States as 
an example,  I briefly discuss the embryonic emergence of state efforts to use computer 
networks to attack adversary societies. Finally, in the paper's conclusion, I reflect upon 
the geopolitics of forced urban disconnection, and demodernisation, within contemporary 
war and strategy.   
 
WAR IN THE ‘WEIRDLY PERVIOUS WORLD’ : 
URBAN INFRASTRUCTURE AND THE CHANGING NATURE OF WAR 
 
Collective facilities and  urban, networked infrastructures that are used by civilians and 
military alike have been a central target in war for as long as they have existed (Graham, 
2004). From the water poisonings of medieval urban sieges to the attempts at total urban 
annihilation that dominated the Second World War, means of movement, communication, 
obtaining water, disposing of waste, and obtaining fuel and energy have long been at the 
heart of struggles for geopolitical and military power between enemies. Such strategies 
have grown more sophisticated and more carefully orchestrated over time (see Pape, 
1996). As well as the 24-hour carpet-bombing of whole cities, for example, the 
mobilisation of operations science by Allied bombing strategists in World War II allowed 
the Allies, within the constraints of bombing accuracy at the time, to try and 
systematically target Germany’s "industrial web". This entailed an attempt at the 
systematic degradation of whole systems of lines of communication and transport, 
electrical power, and  oil and chemical supply (Rattray, 2001, 272).  
 
A wide range of factors are currently leading to a proliferation in the range, frequency and 
sophistication of attacks on the networked infrastructures that sustain every aspect of the 
functioning and development of contemporary cities. Together, these factors mean that 
attempts at the deliberate demodernisation of the whole suite of modern networked 
infrastructures are central elements of contemporary geopolitical  strategy. Increasingly 
common, too, is the appropriation of everyday urban technics as tools of catastrophic 
terrorism (Luke, 2003b). This occurred, of course, with the exploitation of banal capsules 
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of interurban mobility as fuel-laden cruise missiles  during the 9/11 attacks (Graham, 
2001). But it also characterised the attacks on the Madrid train system in March 2004. In 
this case, mobile phone-alarm detonators combined with the inevitable crowding in rush 
hour train carriages to murderous effect. 
 
It is possible to group the factors that are leading to a growing salience, sophistication 
and frequency of deliberate infrastructural warfare into three groups.  
 
Cyborg Urbanization: The Vulnerabilities of Networked Urban Societies 
 
"The world struggle against terrorists will continue because our global 
economy simultaneously creates many possible weapons and angers 
many possible enemies" (Luke, 2003a, 11) 
 
First, the mediation of contemporary 'network societies' (Castells, 1986) by vast arrays of 
technological, computerised systems of flow means that small disruptions and 
disablement can have enormous, cascading, effects on the social, economic and 
environmental life of cities  (Zimmerman, 2001, Little, 2002). As societies urbanise and 
modernise, so their populations become ever more dependent on complex, distanciated 
systems for the sustenance of life (water, waste, food, medicine, goods, commodities, 
energy, communications, transport, and so on). Increasingly, then, urban life is animated 
by complex arrays of technological and infrastructural systems which blur seamlessly into 
social and organic domains. The result is a style of ‘cyborg urbanization’ (Gandy, 2005). 
This is dominated by extended arrays of by  socio-technical ‘hybrids’ through which 
Nature is continually metabolized into Culture  to literally produce the City (Kaika and 
Swyngedouw, 2000).  
 
With pervasive computerisation, software systems provide the functionalities that enable 
these multiple, networked systems to operate (Thrift and French, 2000). This software, of 
course, is now  often  linked intimately into systems of trans-global  and (near) 
instantaneous electronic flow such as the Internet. This makes it extremely vulnerable to 
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external disruption. "One of the advantages of the new computerised economy was 
thought to be that it reduced capitalism's vulnerability to terrorism and theft",  writes Mark 
Lawson. "The use of computer viruses has removed this illusion" (2000, 11). 
 
Disruptions to this palimpsest of everyday urban technics fleetingly reveal the critical 
importance of networked systems which, when they function normally, tend to be ignored 
(or, in sociological parlance, 'blackboxed') by their users. "The normally invisible quality of 
working infrastructure becomes visible when it breaks: the server is down, the bridge 
washes out, there is a power blackout" (Star, 1999, 382). 
 
Conversely, when urban infrastructure networks "work best, they are noticed least of all" 
(Perry, 1995, 2). Catastrophic failures, then, serve to  fleetingly reveal the utter reliance of 
contemporary urban life on networked infrastructures. This is especially so where the 
entire economic system in advanced industrial societies is being been reconstructed 
around highly fragile networks of computers and information technology devices  working 
on 'just in time' principles of fluid and continuous synchronization across space (see 
Rochlin, 1997). 
 
The pervasive importance of twenty-four hour systems of electrically-powered computer 
networks, in supporting all other  urban infrastructures, makes electrical power cuts and 
outages particularly fearful. The explosive recent growth of electronic commerce, 
consumption, and distribution and production systems -- infrastructures that are mediated 
at every level by electrically-powered computer and telecommunications -- means that 
these days we are all, in a sense,  "hostages to electricity" (Leslie, 1999, 175).  
"'Cyberspace' remains an incomprehensible, immaterial, and abstract entity as long as 
we continue to disregard the physical foundation of the artifacts of the electrical 
infrastructure" (Carroll, 2001). 
 
The urban consequences of collapses and outages can quickly become extremely 
expensive and economically and socially catastrophic. "The always-on economy, by 
definition, depends upon continuous energy"  (Platt, 2000, 116-128). This point is not lost 
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on leading IT and software entrepreneurs. Taking an unusually reflective and critical 
stance for a software engineer, Bill Joy, cofounder of Sun Microsystems,  caused a furore 
amongst readers of the bible of the high-tech elite, Wired in 2000.  He suggested that the 
mediation of human societies by astonishingly complex computerised infrastructure 
systems will soon reach the stage when "people won't be able to just turn the machines 
off, because they will be so dependent on them that turning them off would amount to 
suicide" (2000, 239).  
 
As Tim Luke has argued, "some small groups of human beings maybe still can live pre-
machinically, like the Kung of the Kalahari, Haitian fishermen on Hispanola, Mongol 
herdsmen in Siberia, or even the House Amish of Pennsylvania" (2003b). However, Luke 
argues that: 
"many more human beings live highly cyborganized lives, totally dependent 
upon the Denature of machinic ensembles with their elaborate extra-
terrestrial ecologies of megatechnical economics.  This is as true for the 
Rwandans in the refugee camps of Zaire as it is for the Manhattanites in the  
luxury coops of New York City.  Without the agriculture machine, the 
housing machine, the oil machine, the electrical machine, the media 
machine, or the fashion machine, almost all cyborganized human beings 
cannot survive or thrive, because these concretions of machinic ensembles 
generate their basic environment." 
 
All of which means that, more than ever, the collapse of functioning urban infrastructure 
grids now brings panic and fears of the break down of the functioning urban social order. 
"Fear of the dislocation of urban services on a massive scale", writes Martin Pawley,  is 
now "endemic in the populations of all great cities" (1997; 162).   
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Changing Political Economies of Infrastructural Development 
 
Second,  modes of  urban infrastructural development and governance are currently 
being transformed by waves of liberalisation and privatisation (Graham and Marvin, 
2001). Monopolistic, usually public systems, orchestrated through welfare states to 
deliver basic, universal services at the standardised costs to all through cross subsidy, 
are being complemented, and in some cases replaced, by complex infrastructural 
marketplaces.  
 
These processes of re-regulation are restructuring the very socio-technical architectures 
of advanced industrial societies and urban systems. What Gene Rochlin (2002, 8) calls 
"the dismantling and dismemberment, some would say vivisection of [the] Large 
Technical Systems" built up through the 19th and early 20th centuries is taking place. 
The often cavalier adoption of deregulated, market-based regimes of infrastructure 
development -- which often undermine back-up systems and reduce reliability --  has only 
compounded the deepening sense of fear, and the widespread sense of vulnerability and 
emergency, in advanced industrial societies surrounding the dangers of systemic 
technical collapse (ibid. 2002, 8).  
 
As interactions of demand and supply shape investment in sunk infrastructure so, all too 
often, the resilience and maintenance of critical infrastructures have been undermined or 
neglected within newly-liberalised regimes (Rochlin, 2002). This has led to a growing 
degree of fragility and an increasing insecurity of supply. An increasingly wide range of 
crises, accidents and outages -- Auckland's electricity in 1998, the UK rail system 2000-
2002, California's electricity in 2001, London transport's electricity supply in 2002, Italy's 
electricity in 2003, the massive electricity collapse in the North-East USA in 2003 -- have 
been directly linked to the growing fragility of supply caused by the cavalier imposition of 
neoliberal principles onto  infrastructural domains that were previously considered  as 
public goods requiring tight state regulation and control to ensure stable, resilient, supply. 
Within such collapses, "huge urban centers, massive populations, and entire 
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infrastructures find themselves amidst a broken built environment where the typical forms 
of subjectivity for individuals and for groups get bogged down, broken up, browned out or 
even blacked out" (Luke, 2004, 1). 
 
In short, the interrupted supplies that have long been the norm in so-called ‘developing’ 
countries and cities are now  emerging as a normal part of everyday life in the advanced 
industrial world, too. This is occurring at the very same time that these societies are being 
reorganised so that their constituent parts operate through distanciated, just-in-time 
principles, making reliable, continuous,  infrastructural connections ever more important. 
Gene Rochlin writes that: 
"as the most fundamental structures of the technical infrastructural 
systems become radically reconfigured, as not only their component 
parts but their rules, regulations, standards and categories are 
deconstructed, so in turn is our social and political infrastructure. 
Services that were once accepted as not requiring conscious thought, or 
deliberate choice, now need to be attended to  in some cases not just 
once, but frequently and continuously" (2002, 6). 
 
The growing sense of crisis in the connective infrastructures of many Western nations, of 
course, makes them  even more tempting targets for asymmetric techniques of 
infrastructural warfare and  terrorism (Luke, 2003b).  For the most prosaic and taken for 
granted systems and artifacts of urban technics – the electricity system, information 
networks, fuel and food supply systems, streets, suburban trains, subways, cars,  mobile 
‘phones, and, of course, passenger planes – can easily be subverted and transformed into 
weapons of mass disruption, destruction, and often death.  In western cities, such sites are 
now the focus of widespread ‘homeland security’ efforts aimed at improving ‘critical 
infrastructure protection’ against such threats. However, given long standing infrastructure 
crises, a long history of low levels of investment, the liberalization of infrastructure, and the 
sheer impossibility of ‘hardening’ the millions of ‘soft’ infrastructural ‘targets’ that constitute 
cities, it is questionable how effective such efforts have so far been. Naomi Klein (2001, 
21) has even argued that "what is making the US most vulnerable to terrorism is not its 
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depleted weapons arsenal but its starved, devalued and crumbling public sector […]. What 
homeland security really means is a mad rush to reassemble basic public infrastructure 
and resurrect health and safety standards." 
 
The Changing Nature of War 
 
"Strength and weakness, threat and security have become, essentially, 
extraterritorial issues that evade territorial solutions," Bauman (2002, 83, 
original emphasis) 
 
Finally, the above two sets of transformations need to be seen in the context of radical 
changes in the nature of war since the end of the Cold War. Some of these post Cold-
War changes are now very familiar :  
• the proliferation of asymmetric struggles pitching US and western forces, with their 
monopoly of high-tech, precision targeting, against low-tech enemies (usually 
based in cities) ;  
• a greatly reduced frequency of state-vs-state wars with standing armies and a 
consequent further growth in the ratio of civilian casualties in relation to military 
ones ;  
• an increasingly hegemonic presence of US forces around the world who seek to 
consolidate and protect the resource and geopolitical underpinnings that sustain 
the globe-spanning, neoliberal  'Empire,'  increasingly through ‘pre-emptive’ 
expeditionary wars following the doctrine of US neoconservatives  (Hardt and 
Negri, 2000) ;  
• A sustained effort by the US military to utilise its hegemonic position in the 
strategic use of information technologies, and intelligent machines and orbital 
power (De Landa, 1991)  to radically reorganise the reach and power of its strike 
capabilities (the so-called revolution in Military affairs or RMA). This is being 
justified by key neoconservative think-tanks close to the Bush administration so 
that the United States military can achieve 'Full Spectrum Dominance' whilst 
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fighting a  range of adversaries in  major 'theatre wars' simultaneously (Project for 
the New American Century, 2000, Hirst, 2001) ; and 
• An increasing emphasis in geopolitical struggle on what Tim Luke (2003b)  has 
called 'culture war'. This emphasises continuous and instantaneous global media 
representation; the proliferation of electronic and ‘Net based  propaganda; and the 
24/7 consumption of war by quasi-voyeuristic viewers over TV and internet 
networks (Der Derian, 2001). Dochterman (2002, 1)  argues that this new type of 
war boils down to an "information war, in which the television and internet become 
something akin to live, continuous and violent advertisements for the power of the 
military-technological apparatus of the United States and its allies." 
 
With the on-going urbanisation of terrain in many geopolitical conflict zones, we should 
also stress that, increasingly, wars are being fought out, within, and through the domestic 
spaces, and infrastructures, of everyday urban life. More than ever, then, "today, wars 
are fought not in trenches and fields, but in living rooms, schools and supermarkets" 
(Barakat, 1998 11). This is crucial because, as we have noted, civilian urban populations 
are especially vulnerable to war because their lives are sustained by multiple, networked 
systems which continuously link them to distant sources of food, energy, water and other 
goods and services. Cities are especially vulnerable to the stresses of conflict, suggests 
Sultan Barakat, because they "are particularly at risk when their complex and 
sophisticated infrastructure systems are destroyed and rendered inoperable, or when 
they become isolated from external contacts" (1998, 12) 
 
Finally, as we have already noted, war and geopolitical struggle are increasingly being 
fought through the infrastructures of everyday urban life (Graham, 2001). Increasingly, 
the very technics of the city become the very weapon of the terrorist or the state actor – 
the means of projecting power, violence, and symbolically charged destruction. The 9/11 
and Madrid train attacks are, of course, paradigmatic cases here. But, as we shall see, a 
proliferating range of  strategies of state violence are being developed which seek to 
project political pressure through the systematic demodernisation of networked urban life 
in adversary societies and cities.  
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Theoretically, civilians are protected from being directly targeted in war by international 
law (for example, by Article 8(2)(b) (iv) of the International Criminal Court’s Statute).  
However, in effect, the widespread targeting of so-called ‘dual-use’ infrastructures – that 
is, systems like electricity and telecommunications that are used by military and civilian 
personnel alike -- denies this legal protection.  "Such discrimination turns to fiction when 
extended to electrical grids, water supplies, and other infrastructure that are the sinews of 
everyday life" (Smith 2002, 361).  
 
A final shift is the blurring of the times and zones of ‘peace’ from those of ‘war’.  This 
parallels the increasing uselessness of the of civilian-military distinction. Whilst the 
military and civilian casualties during formal times of war may, be reducing (at least as a 
proportion of deaths through political violence), the long-term civilian deaths which result 
from attacks on the crucial infrastructures that sustain urban life -- what Blakeley (2003a) 
has called  'structural violence' or the 'war on public health' -- are increasing. As Smith 
(2002, 362) argues, "while the security community views sanctions and attacks on 
infrastructure as limited remedies, students of human rights find them drastic indeed". 
King and Martin (2001, 2) suggest that "the growing centrality within war of targeting 
everyday infrastructures are making war safer for soldiers and much riskier for civilians. 
The problem is not badly aimed guns [i.e. 'collateral damage'], but rather the increasingly 
severe public health consequences of war" (2001, 2). And these military strategies of 
'bomb now, die later' (Blakeley, 2003a) conveniently hide the long-term degradation and 
killing from the capricious gaze of the global media, whose attention quickly moves on to 
the spectacular  and more direct military ‘collateral damage’  that are the immediate 
results of the United States’ ‘shock and awe’ tactics. Ashford argues that: 
"The insidious effects of destroying the water supply, sewage system, 
agriculture, food distribution, electricity, fuel systems and the economic 
base for an entire country are not obvious until starvation and disease 
create a humanitarian crisis that cannot be ignored. In fact, far from sparing 
the innocent, this deliberate strategy disproportionately kills the very young, 
the very old, and the very weak"  (2000, 3). 
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Considered together, these three parallel transformations in the nature of societies, urban 
infrastructures, and war have huge implications for the very conceptual  distinctions used 
in the analysis and definition of organised political violence. They mean, for example, that 
the conventional distinctions of time and space that demarcate domains of 'peace' from  
zones of 'war' are breaking down. So are demarcations separating 'military' society from 
'civil' society,  'domestic' scales from 'international' ones, and the 'local' from the 'global'.  
 
Overwhelmingly, then, threats are being deterritorialised – at least to the extent that 
technical networks are  increasingly being used to project and direct  violence to very 
local sites from over smaller or greater distances (Luke, 2003b, Herod et al, 1998, Ó 
Tuathail, 1999). As systems of relatively self-contained, Westphalian states give way to 
'frayed' maps of technologised, distanciated risk (Luke and Ó Tuathail, 1998), so, war 
itself is being remodelled within what Phil Agre (2001)  has called the 'weirdly pervious 
world'. This is a world where infrastructural flow, distanciated (dis)connection, and the 
interpenetration of the global and local become both the means of projecting power and 
the Achilles heel of modern, urban societies. "While at one time war elsewhere 
guaranteed peace at the centre of the empire", suggests Umberto Eco, "now the enemy 
strikes precisely and more easily at the centre […]. War abroad no longer guarantees 
peace at home" (2003, 7).  
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“YOU WANT 13891? WE CAN DO THAT !”  
INFRASTRUCTURAL WARFARE AND  U.S. GLOBAL HEGEMONY 
 
“It should be lights out in Belgrade : every power grid, water pipe, bridge, 
road and war-related factory has to be targeted [..].  We will set your 
country back by pulverizing you. You want 1950 ? We can do 1950. You 
want 1389 ? We can do that, too!” (New York Times Columnist, Thomas 
Friedman, April 23rd, 1999, cited in Skoric, 1999) 
 
"We need to study how to degrade and destroy our adversaries' abilities 
to transmit their military, political, and economic goods, services and 
information […]. Infrastructures, defining both traditional and emerging 
lines of communication, present increasingly lucrative targets for 
airpower [The vision of] airmen should focus on lines of communications 
that will increasingly define modern societies" (Felker, 1998, 1-20). 
 
Efforts to forcefully demodernise contemporary societies, by carefully destroying of 
debilitating infrastructural systems, are widely prevalent in today's world. However, rather 
than stemming the efforts of informal terror organisations, as suggested by dominant 
western discourses projecting the purported dangers of ‘cyber-terror’ (see Pineiro, 2004, 
Verton, 2003), they still derive overwhelmingly from the formal violence of nation states. 
Many nation states have developed military doctrine aimed centrally at temporary or 
permanent demodernisation of urbanized adversaries. China is noted for its efforts at 
theorising infrastructural warfare (Liang and Xiangsui, 1999) ; Israel  is well known for 
putting such ideas into brutal practice against Palestinian cities in the Occupied Territories 
(Graham, 2003). Befitting its hegemonic status currently, however, one state, in particular 
– the United States – currently dominates the practice of state infrastructural warfare.   
                                            
1
 1389 was the year  in which Serbia  lost its medieval empire and was absorbed into the 
Ottoman empire – a battle that  is a key event in the formation of Serbian national 
identity 
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Whilst it would be an oversimplification, it is possible to argue that the geopolitical and 
military strategy currently being developed to maintain the United States’s power as a 
global hegemon rests on a simple, two-sided idea. First, develop ICT-based networked 
mobilities and control and surveillance capabilities to a level which allows attempts at 
globe-spanning dominance based on a near-monopoly of space and air power (what is 
being termed network-centric warfare and the ‘Revolution in Military Affairs’ or ‘RMA’- see 
Harris, 2003, Dillon, 2002). Here the need for expeditionary wars to forcibly integrate 
zones deemed to be ‘beyond the functioning core’ of a globalised world have explicitly 
emerged from recent geopolitical thinking in the Pentagon (Barnett, 2004). On the other: 
develop the tools and technologies that can disconnect, demodernise, and immobilise 
adversary societies at any time or place deemed necessary.  (Such demodernise, 
however, seems necessary only to the extent that client regimes can be imposed, 
lucrative ‘reconstruction’ contracts hived off to sympathetic US corporate corporations, 
natural and energy resources directed likewise, and the socio-economic systems can be 
re-engineered from a ‘blank slate’ to provide maximum predatory potential- see Klein, 
2005).  
 
Underpinning US infrastructural warfare strategy is the notion of the "enemy as a 
system". This was devised by a leading US Air Force strategist, John Warden, within 
what he termed his strategic ring theory  (1995) and has been the central strategic idea 
driving all major US bombing campaigns since the late 1980s (Rinaldi, 1995). This 
systematic view of adversary societies, which builds  directly on the industrial web 
theorisation of US air power strategists in World War II,  provides the central US strategic 
theorisation that justifies, and sustains, the rapid extension of that nation’s infrastructural 
warfare capability (Rizer, 2001).  
 
"At the strategic level," writes Warden, "we attain our objectives by causing such changes 
to one or more parts of the enemy's physical system" (1995). This 'system' is seen to 
have five parts or rings : the leadership or 'brain' at the centre ; organic essentials (food, 
energy, ec) ; infrastructure (vital connections like roads, electricity, telecommunications, 
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water etc.) ; the civilian population ; and finally, and least important, the military fighting 
force (Felker, 1998)(see Figure 1). Rejecting the direct targeting of enemy civilians, 
Warden, instead, argues that only indirect attacks on civilians are legitimate. These 
operate through the targeting of societal infrastructures - a means of bringing intolerable 
pressures to bear on the nation's political  leaders.  This doctrine now officially shapes 
the projection of US aerial power and underpins the key U.S Air Force doctrine document  
-- 2-12  --published in 1998 (USAF, 1998).  Warden (1996, 6), recalling its centrality to 
the Iraq and Kosovo campaigns that we’ll explore shortly, outlines how the ‘Strategic Ring 
Theory’ shapes the targeting of infrastructure. “When we want more information” [about 
an adversary society], he writes, “we pull out subsystems like electric power under 
system [‘organic’] essentials and how it as a five-ring system. We may have to make 
several more five-ring models to show successively lower electrical subsystem. We 
continue the process until we have sufficient understanding to act” (i.e. make targeting 
decisions). 
 
Figure 1  John Warden’s (1995) Five-Ring Model of the strategic make-up of 
contemporary societies - a central basis for US military doctrine and strategy to coerce 
change through air power (Source : Felker, 1998, 12). 
 
Kenneth Rizer, another U.S. air power strategist, recently wrote an extremely telling 
article in the official US Air Force Journal Air and Space Power Chronicles.  In it, he 
seeks to justify the direct destruction of dual-use targets (i.e. civilian infrastructures) 
within U.S. strategy. Rizer argued that, in international law, the legality of attacking dual-
use targets "is very much a mater of interpretation" (2001, 1).  
 
Rizer writes that the US military applied Warden's ideas in the 1991 air war in Iraq with, 
he claims, "amazing results". "Despite dropping 88,000 tons in the 43 day campaign, only 
3000 civilians died directly as  a result of the attacks, the lowest number of deaths from a 
major bombing campaign in the history of warfare" (2001, 10). However, he also openly 
admits that -- as we shall soon discuss -- the United State's systematic destruction of 
Iraq's electrical system in 1991 "shut down water purification and sewage treatment 
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plants, resulting in epidemics of gastro-enteritis, cholera, and typhoid, leading to perhaps 
as many as 100,000 civilian deaths and the doubling infant mortality rates" (2001, 1).  
 
Clearly, however, such ‘indirect ‘deaths are of little concern to  US Air Force strategists. 
For Rizer openly admits that: 
"The US Air Force perspective is that when attacking power sources, 
transportation networks, and telecommunications systems, distinguishing 
between the military and civilian aspects of these facilities is virtually 
impossible. [But] since these targets remain critical military nodes within the 
second and third ring of Warden's model, they are viewed as legitimate military 
targets  […] The Air Force does not consider the long-term, indirect effects of 
such attacks when it applies proportionality [ideas] to the expected military 
gain" (2001, 10).  
 
More tellingly still, Rizer goes on to reflect on how US air power is supposed to influence 
the morale of enemy civilians if they can no longer be carpet-bombed. "How does the Air 
Force intend to undermine civilian morale without having an intent to injure, kill, or destroy 
civilian lives ?" he asks: 
 "Perhaps the real answer is that by declaring dual-use targets legitimate 
military objectives, the Air Force can directly target civilian morale. In sum, so 
long as the Air Force includes civilian morale as a legitimate military target, it 
will aggressively maintain a right to attack dual-use targets" (ibid. 11). 
 
In 1998 Edward Felker -- a third US air power theorist, like both Warden and Rizer, is  
based at the U.S. Air War College Air University -- further developed Walden's model. 
This was based on the experience of Desert Storm, and drew on Felker's argument that 
urban infrastructure, rather than a separate 'ring' of the 'enemy as a system', in fact 
pervaded, and connected, all the others to actually "constitute the society as a whole" 
(Figure 2). "If infrastructure links the subsystems of a society," wrote Felker, "might it be 
the most important target ?" (1998, 20). 
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Figure  2  'A new model for societal structure' : Edward Felker's (1998, 19) 
adaptation of  Warden's Five-Ring Model (see Figure 1), stressing the 
centrality of infrastructural warfare to post Cold War U.S. airpower doctrine 
 
By constructing linear, and non-linear models of the first, second, and third-order impacts 
of destroying key parts of the urban networked infrastructure of an adversary society, US 
military planners have started to develop a complex military doctrine underpinning the 
extension of US infrastructural, and urban, warfare. This centres on organised, 
systematic demodernisation not just of the military forces of those deemed to be 
enemies, but of their urban civil societies as well. Table 1 presents a good example of 
this from a report on how US ‘urban operations’ like those targeting the Iraq insurgency in 
2004 need to manipulate the infrastructures of systems to produce effects that work to 
sway the battles in their favour. Indeed, US military analysis here is now concentrating on 
finding the 'tipping points' in critical infrastructure systems that will lead to the non-linear, 
spiral effects that will most rapidly induce complete, societal chaos (Felker, 1998). 
 
Table 1  Paterson's Models of the First, Second and Third-Order Effects of 
Disrupting an Enemy's Critical Infrastructure Systems in ‘Urban’, Counter-
Insurgency warfare : The Example of Electric Power  (2000, pp. 6) 
 
First Order Effects Second Order Effects Third Order Effects 
No light after dark or in 
building interiors 
Erosion of command and 
control capabilities 
Greater logistics 
complexity 
No refrigeration Increased requirement 
for power generating 
equipment 
Decreased mobility 
Some stoves/ovens non 
operable 
Increased requirement 
for night vision devices 
Decreased Situational 
Awareness 
Inoperable hospital 
electronic equipment 
Increased reliance on 
battery-powered items for 
news, broadcasts, etc. 
Rising disease rates 
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No electronic access to 
bank accounts/money 
Shortage of clean water 
for drinking, cleaning and 
preparing food 
Rising rates of 
malnutrition 
Disruption in some 
transportation and 
communications services 
Hygiene problems Increased numbers of 
non-combatants requiring 
assistance 
Disruption to water 
supply, treatment 
facilities, and sanitation 
Inability to prepare and 
process some foods 
Difficulty in 
communicating with non-
combatants 
 
The latter is a doctrine labelled ‘effects-based operations’. This centres on the importance 
of manipulating adversary societies from both near and afar, to bring unsustainable 
pressure to bear on leadership so that capitulation to the will of the US state occurs and 
resistance is abandoned.  Crucially, effects-based operations doctrine stipulates that, 
rather than physically destroying relatively small numbers of targets in series over long 
periods of time (as in World War II), the US now has the capacity to engage in ‘parallel 
war’ trough the manipulation and targeting of all of the key assets of society deemed to 
be an adversary of the United States simultaneously (Steblin, 1997). The manipulation, 
disruption or destruction of urban infrastructure – drawing on a long history of ‘air power 
theory’ produced since before World war II -- is one of the key mechanism for achieving 
this, along with ‘precision’ targeting and almost omnipotent levels of surveillance. The 
doctrine of ‘effects-based’ targeting involves complex theories about precisely how 
interventions will bring first, second and third order effects on a society – and how these 
‘effects’ can be brought to bear in ‘non-lethal’ ways. Many of these draw on complexity 
theories (Freniere, 2003) and non-linear ‘holistic’ theories of the “multiple, interacting 
infrastructure elements” that constitute target societies (Rinaldi, 1995, v). They invoke 
notions of ‘emergence’ to study how simultaneous disruptions of multiple urban 
infrastructures – what Rinaldi, (1995) tellingly terms ‘dissecting’ adversary societies 
before bombing them -- simultaneously will produce the effects that US military planners 
desire.  Here efforts are focused on identifying ‘bottlenecks’ and closely-coupled systems 
so that bombing can have maximum and immediate impacts. Finally, such efforts involve 
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an analysis of  “substitutes, workarounds,  emergency plans, and repair capabilities” 
which may “obviate some seemingly promising economic targets” (Rinaldi, 1995, 26).  In 
reality, however, the efforts which result – despite the obfuscatory rhetoric, the military 
geekspeak and the endless euphemisms -- generally involve widescale physical bombing 
and destruction of urban targets and infrastructures (Steblin, 1997). 
 
To sum up, the reorganisation of U.S. military strategy as part of the shift to 'network 
centric warfare' and the Revolution in Military Affairs, is, crucially, centred not on territorial 
mobilisations of industrialised killing machines to extend, or defend, national territory. 
Rather, it involves a networked, real-time, and meticulously coordinated effort to destroy 
strategic targets and bring down or destabilise the complex, multifaceted urban 
infrastructure and media systems that are seen as the very connective tissue of 
adversary societies.  
 
This transformation has been backed by adjustments in international law which legitimise 
and legalise ‘precision’ assaults on dual-use civil infrastructure.  As Smith writes, "these 
changes have been a boon for [US] public relations officers, because, probably, the U.S. 
is alone in being capable of waging legal warfare on a  vast scale because of its near 
monopoly on [the] precision guided weapons" needed to precisely target dual-use 
infrastructures (2002, 36). 
 
Whilst  the abstract theorisation of doctrine and tactics outlined in this section are 
revealing, the centrality of infrastructural warfare to emerging U.S. geopolitical strategy 
can only  be fully understood when specific case studies are investigated. In what follows 
two of these are developed. These focus on the war in Kosovo in 1991 and the war-
sanctions-war experience in Iraq between 1991 and 2004. In both these cases, theories 
of the ‘enemy as a system’, infrastructural warfare, and ‘effects-based’ operations were 
directly employed to drive the timing, spacing and nature of the bombing campaign 
(Warden, 1996).  
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SYSTEMATIC  DE-ELECTRIFICATION : KOSOVO 1999 
 
"[The Kosovo War] totally bypassed territorial space. It was a war that took 
place almost entirely in the air. There were hardly any Allied personnel on 
the ground" (Virilio, 2000, 2-3).  
 
In the Kosovo war  of 1999 the United States deployed a new type of bomb which rains 
down graphite crystals to comprehensively disable electrical power and distribution 
stations. It was, the US military argued, a new method of disabling an enemy without the 
public relations embarrassments and unnecessary 'collateral damage' that often follow 
carpet bombing and the use of so-called ‘precision’ guided munitions (which still have a 
habit of killing civilians even when they hit their targets).  
 
As the US-led NATO coalition  decided to intervene against Serbian forces  in the region 
-- purportedly as an attempt to quell genocidal acts of ethnic cleansing -- a new form of 
aerial strategy unfolded. The first forty days of aerial assault used traditional bombs and 
cruise missiles with explosive warheads to target air defense systems, media 
transmission masts, command and control capabilities,  oil refineries, bridges, transport 
systems, and communications networks. Following this, U.S. planners put a previously 
secret weapon to work to totally demodernise Serbian urban society  within a  matter of a 
few hours.  
 
Between the 13th  and 31st of May highly classified weapons, known as BLU-114 'Soft' 
Bombs, were rained down by stealth fighters on critical points on the Serbian electrical 
generation system.  Raining a hail of graphite filaments, these bombs short-circuited 37 
electrical transformers, plunging large swathes of Serbia into a blackout for four days. 
Smaller outages continued until mid June. On May 24th in the Nation, columnist Stephen 
Cohen reported that "the foundations of the elementary well-being of ordinary men, 
women and children  have already been destroyed" (cited in Saunders, 2000). 
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The bomb's filaments --  less than 0.1 mm thick -- had been carefully designed to float in 
the air like a dense cloud, allowing the short circuits to be established between various 
elements of electrical equipment that allow generator and switching stations to function.  
The extremely high energy arcs created by the shorting can cause an explosion that 
sends fragmented metal flying in all directions.  In addition, the power surges created by 
the short-circuiting are designed to destroy fragile electrical equipment throughout the 
network, whilst creating a complete blackout.  
 
The effects of the blackout on Milosovic's hold on power are still unclear. It has been 
reported that "the ability of Milosovic's forces to fight on was impaired. Drinking water 
supplies, which relied on electric pumps,  were severely interrupted. And food supplies 
and the provision of medical care were severely impaired . General levels of social 
disorder increased,  particularly at night" (Patterson, 2000, 50). One Serbian reporter, 
who witnessed the blackouts in Belgrade, remarked that "when we shut off electricity to a 
city, we also change the social order in that city : statistically, in the event of a power 
outage, the more bestial part of ourselves takes over" (Skoric, 1999).  A Serbian 
computer activist wrote on 3rd May 1999 about his personal reaction to the blackouts. 
"Yesterday some idiot decided to bomb all the main electric plants in Serbia", he wrote. 
"When I woke up early this morning I could only sit silently in the darkness of my room, 
the darkness of my city, watching darkness on my computer screen ! What the hell --- the 
Serbian army is using electric power, so lets cut it out completely right ?!" (quoted in 
Lovinck, 1999).  
 
William Church, then Director of the Center for Infrastructural Warfare Studies, is clear 
about the importance of Kosovo. To him, Kosovo qualifies as "a stage for future wars in 
terms of weapons targeted at information infrastructures to effect the decision processes 
of both government leaders and the civilian population" (1999, 1). In addition to the 'soft' 
bombs, U.S. Air Force hackers also undertook an extensive campaign of reducing the 
functionality of Serbian information systems during the war (ibid.).  
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Following the Kosovo experiment, Church argued in 2001 that "the lethal combination of 
technology and infrastructural targeting [was] accepted practice for the United States 
military not only during times of open hostility but, more critically, in times of peace as a 
political compliance strategy" (2001, 1).   
 
Church also revealed that the Kosovo  air campaign to systematically demodernise 
Serbian society had actually been reduced in intensity by politicians, who balked at the 
strategies suggested by the Generals commanding the air war. For example, the 
commander of the air war in Kosovo., Lt. General Michael C. Short, stated in a 1999 New 
York Times article that: 
 "had airmen been in charge, it would have been done differently. I 
felt that on the first night [of the bombing] the power should  have 
gone off, and major bridges around Belgrade should lave gone 
into the Danube, and the water should have been cut off" (18 
June, 1999, cited in Church, 2002).  
 
Wesley Clarke, supreme allied commander in Europe during the war, also suggested in 
late 1999 that a much more comprehensive programme of offensive hacking against all 
aspects of Serbia's infrastructural, media and informational assets would have been even 
more devastating than the NATO strategy that was adopted. This, Clark admits, was 
"designed to demolish, destroy, devastate, degrade, and ultimately eliminate the 
essential infrastructure of the country" (quoted in San Francisco Labor Council statement 
against the Kosovo bombing campaign -- see Saunders, 2000, Borger, 1999).   
 
 ‘BOMB NOW, DIE LATER’ :   
THE ‘WAR ON PUBLIC HEALTH’ IN IRAQ  -- 1991-2005  
 
"No violence short of a nuclear explosion has been as intense as the air 
onslaught unleashed upon Iraq" (Bolkcom and Pike, 1993, 2) 
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"Destroying the means of producing electricity is particularly attractive 
because it can not be stockpiled" (Bolkcom and Pike, 1993, 2) 
 
"The bottom line in comprehensive infrastructure bombing is that it kills 
civilians whilst the adversary's military power remains largely intact" 
(Bolkcom and Pike, 1993, 6) 
 
The First Gulf War, 1991 
   
More primitive graphite bombs had also been a feature of the U.S.-led coalition's massive 
aerial assault against Iraq in the First Gulf War in 1991. But these were eclipsed in their 
impact by the biggest conventional aerial assault in history : a war that Thomas Smith 
(2002, 363)  argues was also one of the most unbalanced uses of military force in history. 
As with the later Kosovo assault, the Desert Storm bombing campaign was targeted 
heavily against dual-use urban infrastructure systems, a strategy that Ruth Blakeley has 
famously termed 'Bomb Now, Die Later' (2003a). Because the reconstrcution of these 
life-sustaining infrastructures was made impossible by the sanctions regime that was 
imposed between 1991 and 2003, it is now clear that the 1991 demodernisation of Iraqi 
metropolitan life -- in a  profoundly urbanised nation – created one of the largest, 
engineered public health catastrophes of the late 20th century.  
 
Because Iraq's actual military targets were so easily annihilated, it is crucial to realise that 
what happened in Desert Storm was that a very large percentage of strategic aerial 
missions were targeted against industry, power generation, roads and bridges, rather 
than military assets (Bolkcom and Pike, 1993, 3).  The military planners, and lawyers,  
behind Desert Storm, made the most of the unprecedented unevenness of the forces, 
and the resulting lack of opposition to Allied air and space forces, in their target planning.   
 
Along with military and communication networks, urban infrastructures were amongst the 
key targets  receiving the bulk of the bombing. One U.S. air war planner, Lt. Col. David 
Deptula, passed a message to Iraqi civilians via the world’s media as the 'planes started 
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going in : "hey, your lights will come back on as soon as you get rid of Saddam!" (cited in 
Rowat, 2003). Another, Brigadier General Buster Glosson, explained that infrastructure 
was the main target because the U.S. military wanted to "put every household in an 
autonomous mode and make them feel they were isolated… We wanted to play with their 
psyche" (cited in Rowat, 2003). As Colin Rowat suggests, for perhaps 110,000 Iraqis, this 
"playing" was ultimately to prove fatal. Bolkcom and Pike recall the centrality of targeting 
‘dual-use’ infrastructures in the planning of ‘Desert Storm’ :  
"From the beginning of the campaign, Desert Storm decision makers 
planned to bomb heavily the Iraqi military-related industrial sites and 
infrastructure, while leaving the most basic economic infrastructures of the 
country intact. What was not apparent or what was ignored, was that the 
military and civilian infrastructures were inextricably interwoven" (3) 
 
The political rationale of "turning the lights off in Baghdad"  generated much debate 
amongst Gulf War bombing planners (Blakeley  2003a 25). The U.S. Military's Gulf War 
Air Power Survey (GWAPS), completed by the U.S. Defense Department at the formal 
end of the war,  revealed that: 
 "there was considerable discussion of the results that could be expected 
from attacking electric power. Some argued that … the loss of electricity in 
Baghdad and other cities would have little effect on popular morale ; others 
argued that the affluence created by petro-dollars had made the city’s 
population psychologically dependent on the amenities associated with 
electric power" (Keaney and Cohen, 1993, vol ii part ii, ch 6 p 23, footnote 
53) 
 
Thus, the systematic annihilation of infrastructure, used by both military and civilians alike 
-- to disable Iraq's war machine and influence civilian morale -- led, indirectly, to mass 
civilian casualties, as urban society was ruthlessly demodernised. "On the whole, civilian 
suffering is not caused by near misses [collateral damage], but by direct hits on the 
country's industrial infrastructure" (Bolkcom and Pike, 1993,  2).  
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As in the later Kosovo attack just discussed, a prime target of the air assault was Iraq's 
electricity generating system. During Desert Storm, the allies flew over 200 sorties 
against electrical plants.  The destruction was devastatingly effective ; 
"almost 88% of Iraq's installed generation capacity was sufficiently 
damaged or destroyed by direct attack, or else isolated from the national 
grid through strikes on associated transformers and switching facilities, to 
render it unavailable. The remaining 12% was probably unusable other 
than locally due to damage inflicted on transformers and switching yards 
(Keaney and Cohen, 1993,  vol, II, part II, ch. 6, pp. 20 cited in Blakeley  
2003a,  20)  
 
Bolkcom and Pike add that :  
"More than half of the 20 electrical generator sites were 100 percent 
destroyed. Only three escaped totally unscathed […] The bombing of 
Iraq's infrastructure was so effective that, on either the sixth or the 
seventh day of the air war, the Iraqis shut down what remained of the 
national power grid. It was useless" (5).  
 
The surfeit of armed aircraft, combined with a paucity of real targets (and a very poor or 
non-existent enforcement of international law) led to a total overkill in the process of 
demodernising Iraq by bombs. As Bolkcom and Pike admit, in this type of overwhelming, 
and totally uneven, aerial onslaught, an extremely wide range of targets were attacked, 
not because they needed to be, but because they could be. An ever-lengthening list of 
targets was sanctioned simply because of the unopposed air power and ordinance that 
was available, literally hanging around Iraqi airspace,  looking for things to destroy. 
Bolkcom and Pike offer the example of al-Hartha power plant in Basra. First attacked on 
the first night of the bombing: 
"The initial attack shut down the plant completely, damaging the water 
treatment system and all four steam boilers. During the course of the 
conflict, al-Hartha was bombed 13 times, even though there would be 
little opportunity to repair the power station during a major war. The final 
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attack bounced the rubble a half hour before the cease fire on February 
28, 1991 […] Reportedly, the power plant was bombed so frequently 
because it was designated a backup target for pilots unable to attack 
their primary targets […] The goal of multiple bombings late in the war 
was to create postwar influence over Iraq. It is very difficult to repair a 
power generator, for example, when the repair personnel have no power" 
(Bolkcom and Pike, 1993, 5) 
 
Another reason for the savagery of the demodernisation was a failure to enforce even the 
extremely questionable guidelines for infrastructural bombing adopted in the planning of 
Desert Storm.  These clearly stated that, in the case of electricity, “only 
transformer/switching yards and control buildings were to be targets and not generator 
halls, boilers and turbines” (Blakeley  2003a, 20). The reasoning behind this was that it 
would take much longer to repair the latter to be reconstructed whilst the former could be 
repaired relatively easily, cheaply and quickly.  
 
Such guidelines were largely ignored, however. The Gulf War Air Power Survey 
concluded that  "the self-imposed restrictions against hitting generator halls or their 
contents was not widely observed in large part because the planners elected to go after 
the majority of Iraq's 25 major power stations and the generator halls offered the most 
obvious aim points" (Keaney and Cohen, 1993, cited in Blakeley  2003a, 20).  
 
It is no surprise, then, that, at war’s end, Iraq had only 4% of pre-war electricity supplies. 
After 4 months only 20-25% of pre-war levels had been attained, a level of supply 
"roughly analogous to that of the 1920s  before Iraq had access to refrigeration and 
sewage treatment" (Bolkcom and Pike, 1993, 5).  The devastation of the generator halls 
and turbines would have condemned Iraqi society to a largely non-electric future for years 
to come, even if Western technological and financial assistance had been possible in 
rebuilding.  
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The UN under-secretary general Martti Ahtisaari, reporting on a visit to Iraq in  March 
1991, was clearly shaken by what he had seen.  "Nothing that we had seen or read had 
quite prepared us for the particular form of devastation that has now befallen the 
country," he wrote: 
"The recent conflict has wrought near-apocalyptic results upon an 
economically mechanised society. Now, most means of modern life 
support have been destroyed or rendered tenuous. Iraq has, for some 
time to come, been relegated to  a pre-industrial age, but with all the 
disabilities of post-industrial dependency on an intensive use of energy 
and technology […] Virtually all previously available sources of fuel and 
power, and modern means of communication are now, essentially, 
defunct… there is much less than the minimum fuel required to provide 
the energy needed for movement or transportation, irrigation or generators 
for power to pump water or sewage  (reported in Perez de Cueller, 1991, 
cited in Blakeley, 2003a, part 8) 
 
Even immediately after  the war’s end, the UN reported that: 
 "Iraqi rivers are heavily polluted by raw sewage, and water levels 
are unusually low. All sewage treatment plants have been brought 
to  a virtual standstill by the lack of power supply and the lack of 
spare parts. Pools of sewage lie in the streets and villages. Health 
hazards will build in weeks to come" (de Cueller, 1991, cited in 
Blakeley  2003a, 25).   
 
Post-War Sanctions and Bombing, 1991-2003 
 
The most devastating impact of mass de-electrification was indirect. Iraq's water and 
sewage systems, relying completely of electrical pumping stations, completely ground to a 
halt. Prospects of repair, as with the electrical system, were reduced virtually to zero. This 
was because of the U.S. Coalition's punitive regime of sanctions that were introduced, with 
the help of UN resolutions,  just before the war. As a result, virtually any item or supply 
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required for infrastructural repair was classified, and prohibited, as a ‘dual-use’ item with 
military potential – ironically, the slippery legal jargon that had legitimised the massive 
infrastructural destruction in the first place 
 
Now-declassified documents from the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) 
demonstrate the degree to which the U.S. military were aware of the terrible impacts of the 
combination of aerial demodernisation and sanctions on public health in post-war Iraq. 
Thomas Nagy (2001) has demonstrated that DIA memos in early 1991 clearly  predicted 
what they called “a full degradation of Iraq's water system."  The memos argued that a  
failure to get hold of embargoed water treatment equipment would inevitably lead to 
massive food and  water shortages, a collapse of preventive medicine,  an inability to 
dispose of waste, and a spread of epidemics of disease like cholera, diarrhoea, meningitis, 
and typhoid.  
 
These, in turn, it was predicted, would lead to huge casualty rates, "particularly amongst 
children, as no adequate solution exists for Iraq's water purification dilemma [under 
sanctions]" (cited in Nagy , 2001).    The memo titled “Disease Outbreaks in Iraq,” dated 
February 21st 1991, (DIA, 1991), stated that "conditions are favorable for communicable 
disease outbreaks, particularly in major urban areas affected by coalition bombing" (cited 
in Nagy , 2001). Despite all this, planners went ahead with the imposition of the sanctions. 
 
By 1999, these predictions had come true. Drinkable water availability in Iraq had fallen 
to 50% of 1990 levels (Blakeley  2003b, 2). Colin Rowat, of the Oxford Research Group,  
has calculated that: 
 "the number of Iraqis who died in 1991 from the effects of the Gulf war or 
postwar turmoil approximates 205,500. There were relatively few deaths 
(approximately 56,000 military personnel and 3,500 civilian) from direct war 
affects. The largest component of deaths derives from the 111,000 
attributable to postwar adverse health effects" (Rowat, 2002) 
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Using a longer time-frame, UNICEF (1999) reported that, between 1991 and 1998, there 
were, statistically, over 500,000 excess deaths amongst Iraqi children under five -- a six-
fold increase in death rates for this group occurred between 1990 and 1994. Such figures 
mean that,  "in most parts of the Islamic world, the sanctions campaign is considered 
genocidal" (Smith, 2002, 365). The  majority of deaths, from preventable, waterborne 
diseases, were aided by the weakness brought about by widespread malnutrition. The 
World Health Organisation reported in 1996 that : 
"the extensive destruction of electricity generating plants, water 
purification and sewage treatment plants during the six-week 1991 
war, and the subsequent delayed or incomplete repair of these 
facilities, leading to a lack of personal hygiene, have been 
responsible for an explosive rise in the incidence of enteric 
infections, such as cholera an typhoid" (cited in in Blakeley  2003a, 
23).   
 
By 1999 John and Karl Mueller  (1999, 51), responded to an ongoing obsession with 
Rogue States' ‘Weapons of Mass Destruction’ in U.S. security policy, by calculating that 
"economic sanctions may well have been a cause of the deaths of more people in Iraq 
than have been slain by all so-called weapons of mass destruction  [i.e. nuclear, chemical 
and biological weapons] throughout history". 
 
The Second Gulf War, 2003-2005:  
“Welcome to The Republic of Darkness and Unemployment”  
 
Not surprisingly, the second, even more savage onslaught of aerial bombing that Iraq was 
subjected to in 2003 -- organised as it was after 12 years of systematic demodernisation 
and impoverisation through sanctions and continued bombing -- led to an even more 
complete demodernisation of everyday urban life in the country. This has occurred even 
though key centralised infrastructure nodes were targeted less extensively than in 1991. 
This time,  the bombing strategy was ostensibly designed to "avoid power plants, public 
water facilities, refineries, bridges,  and other civilian structures" (Human Rights Watch, 
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2003). But new weapons,  including electromagnetic pulse (EMP) cruise missiles,  were 
used for the first time to comprehensively 'fry' ‘dual-use’ communications and control 
equipment  (Smith, 2003, Kopp, 1996). 
 
Nevertheless, dual-use systems such as electrical and  power transmission grids, media 
networks, and telecommunications infrastructures were still substantially  targeted and 
destroyed. Media installations and antennae were destroyed by new CBU-107 Passive 
Attack Weapons -- non-explosive cluster bombs which rain metal rods onto sensitive 
electrical systems that are nicknamed 'rods from God' by the US Air Force (Human Rights 
Watch, 2003, 3). In addition, more  traditional bombs were used to destroy Al-Jazeera's 
office in Baghdad on April 8th, killing several journalists (Tahboub, 2003). This was 
because the Pentagon considered the highly successful, independent channel's coverage 
of the dead civilians that resulted from the bombing was undermining its propaganda (or 
PSYOPS) campaign aimed at asserting information dominance (Miller, 2004). As Miller 
suggests, in current U.S. geopolitical strategy, "the collapse of distinctions between 
independent news media and psychological operations is striking" (2004, 24).  
 
Finally, as in 1991 and Kosovo, carbon 'soft' bombs were once again widely used on 
electricity distribution systems. The resulting fires completely ruined  many newly-repaired 
transformer stations, creating, once again, a serious crisis of water distribution because of 
the resulting power blackouts (Human Rights Watch, 2003, 3). In addition, the old and 
decayed water pipes in Iraq's main cities often fractured simply through the seismic shocks 
of nearly explosions. In al-Nasiriyya Human Rights Watch researchers found that "in many 
places people had dug up water and sewage pipes outside their homes in a vain attempt 
to get drinking water." Once again, large numbers of waterborne intestinal infections were, 
not surprisingly,  reported after the war,  a direct result of the targeting of electrical 
distribution systems (Enders, 2003).  
 
WAR WITHOUT BOUNDARIES :  
TOWARDS STATE COMPUTER NETWORK ATTACK (CNA) 
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According to William Church, Director of the Center for Infrastructural Warfare Studies, 
the next frontier of infrastructural warfare will involve nation states developing the 
capacity to undertake the types of  coordinated ‘cyberterror’ attacks that they are so 
comprehensively mobilising against. "The challenge here," he writes, "is to break into the 
computer systems that control a country's infrastructure, with the result that the civilian 
infrastructure of a nation would be held hostage" (Church, 2000, 3). Church argues that 
NATO considered such tactics in Kosovo and that the idea of cutting Yugoslavia's 
internet connections were raised at NATO planning meetings, but that NATO rejected 
these tactics as problematic. But, within the United State's emerging doctrine of 
Integrated Information Operations and infrastructural warfare -- which involve everything 
from destroying electric plants, dropping Electronic Magnetic Pulse (EMP) bombs which 
destroy all electrical equipment within a wide area and developing globe-spanning 
surveillance systems like Echelon,  to dropping leaflets and disabling web sites --  a 
dedicated capacity to use software systems to attacks opponent's critical infrastructures 
is now under rapid development. 
 
Deliberately manipulating computer systems to disable opponent's civilian infrastructure 
is being labelled Computer Network Attack (or CNA) by the U.S. military.  It is being 
widely seen as a powerful new weapon, an element of the wider 'Full Spectrum 
Dominance' strategy (US Department of Defence, 2000). Drawing again on Walden's 
Ring Theory, and its derivatives, Kelley, (1996) -- author of a major US Air Force strategy 
document Air Force 2025 -- outlines the rationale: 
"the information warfare battlespace is the information-dependent global 
system of systems of which most of the strengths, weaknesses, and centers 
of gravity of an adversary's military, political, social and economic 
infrastructure depend.  That is, not only must the question 'What and where 
are the data on which these infrastructures depend ?' be answered, but, 
equally important, we must ask 'what are the structures and patterns of 
human activity depending on these databases and communications 
infrastructures ?' Information attack requires more than a knowledge of 
wires." (2) 
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Whilst the precise details of this emerging U.S. CNA capability remain classified, some 
elements are becoming clear. First, it is clear that a major research and development 
programme is underway at the Joint Warfare Analysis Center at Dahlgren (Va.), into the 
precise computational and software systems that sustain the critical infrastructures of real 
or potential adversary nations. Major General Bruce Wright, Deputy Director of 
Information Operations at the Center, revealed in 2002 that "a team at the Center can tell 
you not just how a power plant or rail system [within an adversary's country] is built, but 
what exactly is involved in keeping that system up and making that system efficient" 
(cited in Church, 2002).  
 
Second, as with its mirror image -- critical infrastructure protection in the 'Homeland' -- a 
main focus in such offensive information operations is to find ways of destroying the often 
commercial software code that makes advanced infrastructures function. This is known 
as SCADA, or Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition. "One of the terms I've learned 
from these guys," continued Wright, "is SCADA. Basically, SCADA is the computer 
control for a power system or railroad, sewer, or water system. We relate more and more 
on those kinds of systems as potential targets, and sometimes very lucrative targets, as 
we go after adversaries" (ibid.).  
 
In the US Air Force doctrine document Air Force 2025, Kelly (1996, 2) argues that 
"monitoring will be required of developments in commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) systems 
which could be used to attack industrial systems (anti-SCADA programs) [and] financial 
and communications networks." The driving idea here is to develop the capability of what 
Kelly calls  "a Full Spectrum attack on the adversary's information infrastructure which 
renders him blind, deaf and dumb, so facilitating the dominant maneuver of US forces" 
(1996, 4). The guiding principle here is that: 
"adversary military forces are ultimately an output or peripheral of a 
weapon system and its sustaining, often civil, infrastructure. Corrupt the 
sustaining systems and, like a driver deprived on his oxygen supply, the 
adversary military force may be ineffective. Once the pattern of 
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information-dependent human activities is identified, the information 
target can be detected and identified, and the data on which the activity 
is dependent could be intercepted, destroyed, or corrupted by 
appropriate replacement […] in peace and war" (1996, 5). 
 
In other words, what Kelley's report demonstrates is that the techniques to attempt to 
computerised disablement of entire societies --  both in peace and war -- are not  only 
envisaged by the US military: they were actually under development way back in 1996 
(ibid. 5)  Whilst Protocol I of United Nations Resolution 3384 on human rights protection 
(1975) bans such attempts to disable civilian infrastructures in war, the U.S. military has, 
as we have seen, repeatedly defended their right to use computer network and physical 
attacks to disable dams, dykes and nuclear generating stations (Church, 2002).  
 
Third, It is clear that, in the 2003 invasion of Iraq, unspecified offensive computer network 
attacks were undertaken by US forces (Onley, 2003). Richard Myers, Commander in 
Chief of U.S. Space Command, the body tasked with Computer Networked Attack, 
admitted in January 2000 that "the U.S. has already undertaken computer networked 
attacks on a case-by-case basis" (cited in Stone, 2000). A National Presidential Directive 
on Computer Network Attack, (number 16), signed by George Bush in July 2003,  
demonstrated the shift from blue-sky research to bedded-down doctrine in this area. 
Illustrating the difficulty of controlling the cascading and multiple-scaled failures of 
networked systems, U.S. Air Force computer network attack staff considered the 
disablement of Iraqi financial systems. But they "rejected the idea because the Iraqi 
banking network is closely linked to financial communication network in France" (Smith, 
2003). This meant that "an attack therefore might have brought down the ATM machines 
in Europe as well" (ibid.). "We don't have many friends in Paris right now", one unnamed 
U.S. intelligence source is quoted as saying. "No need to make more trouble if Chirac 
won't be able to get any Euros out of his ATM" (ibid). 
 
Church argues, in fact, that the governments of the world have already entered into an 
"Information Operations arms race" (ibid.). He believes that: 
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"the core issue is that information operations is a weapon of mass 
destruction, and we need to face that fact. When you map infrastructures 
right, combine that with good intelligence, combine that with goof 
simulation programes coupled with command and control software, then 
you can design an approach that will destroy a nation" (quoted in Seffers, 
1998, 2). 
 
Finally, it is clear that efforts to move from wholesale infrastructural annihilation, to the 
real-time remote control of adversary infrastructure, is a key part of the U.S. military's 
efforts to reorganise approaches to fighting to address the difficulties of urban warfare 
(Graham, 2003, 2004a). According to Roger Spiller, a leading U.S. Army developer of 
urban warfare doctrine, U.S. forces : 
"need to establish  a measure of control over a city's virtual or physical 
environment. Every city's power supply is automated to some degree, for 
instance, and the larger the city, the more the demands [amongst 
attacking US forces] for manipulating the power at certain times and 
levels, since no city operates uniformly. Destroying this power supply 
would be relatively simple, and, in fact, that has been the usual manner 
of dealing with it, but we need not restrict our options to turning switches 
on and off. Technical and other means exist whereby control, or at least 
measures of system interference, can be inserted before a conflict 
begins" (2000, 108). 
 
However, two major problems are likely to beset any such efforts to destroy or manipulate 
everyday infrastructures from afar by electronic means. First, not all societies are mediated 
by more fragile, software based critical infrastructures. Even when they are, infrastructure 
systems are often a great deal more resilient to electronic manipulation than is widely 
assumed. We should note, however, that the concerted might of U.S. military power is 
likely to be a great deal more capable in achieving infrastructure breakdown via malicious 
code than terrorist networks or lone hackers.   
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Second, as the flippant remarks about Chirac's ATM demonstrate, computer network 
attacks may, ironically, prove to be too successful.  The incredible speed with which 
computer viruses march around the world via the Internet shows that, in today's intensively 
interconnected world, malignant code is rarely easily contained within one particular nation. 
Clearly, there remains a very high risk that, following such attacks, "malicious code might 
inadvertently spread throughout the Internet to severely affect or shut down critical 
infrastructure systems in other non-combatant countries" (Wilson, 2003, 16). 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
“Networked technology provides new global actors the means to traverse 
political economic, religious and cultural boundaries, changing not only how 
war is fought and peace is made, but making it difficult to sustain the very 
distinction of not only accidental, incidental, and intentional acts of war but 
peace itself” (Der Derian, 2003). 
 
 Four central conclusions are evident from this paper. The first is that the intersections of 
neoliberal globalisation, the changing nature of war, the contested emergence of a highly 
networked and neoliberal, capitalist, and US-dominated empire, and the liberalisation of 
urban infrastructure systems, have now become central sites of geopolitical struggle. 
From the 9/11 attacks, through the (still largely chimeric) discourses of cyberterror, to the 
central place of the forced urban demodernisation and computer network attack within 
contemporary US military doctrine, the ability to use, and pervert, the everyday technics 
of urban life for geopolitical ends has become a driving force in contemporary of war and 
strategy.  Whilst the complete physical devastation of infrastructure during US attacks 
may be gradually decreasing – at least if we compare the 1991 and 2003 attacks – US air 
power theorists, under the guise of ‘effects-based’ operations, are finding newer ways of 
systematically disconnecting cities and societies, with no less debilitating and dangerous 
impacts for urban public health. 
 
Crucially, the proliferation of state infrastructural war forces us to reconsider the very 
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notion of war. Here, ‘wars’ are no longer declared. They no longer end in peace treaties. 
And they are no longer confined to territorially-distinct battlefields. As military and civil 
blur together, so the temporal and spatial boundaries separating domains of peace from 
those of war break down or evaporate completely. In their place, potentially boundless, 
continuous and distanciated landscapes of conflict, risk and unpredictable attack emerge. 
Through these, the everyday technics of urban life, so usually taken for granted and 
ignored, become key geopolitical sites through their use as mediating mechanisms for 
the projection of organised, structural, or symbolic violence, over distance, by state and 
non-state actors alike (Luke, 2004). Indeed, there are signs that, in globalised, 
networked, and highly urbanised societies, which rely utterly and continuously on 
complex, multi-layered and often ignored technical systems, war and terrorism 
increasingly become strategies of deliberate ‘decyborganisation’ and demodernisation 
through orchestrated assaults on everyday, networked, technics (Luke, 2004). Whilst 
such warfare is partly deterritorialised, ironically its targets are the profoundly 
territorialized infrastructural assets of cities and regions which are, quite literally, ‘sunk’ 
into territory to facilite mobilities and interactions. 
 
Such notions of war being literally unleashed from the boundaries of time and space -- 
what Paul James has termed 'metawar' (2003) -- pushes a two-pronged doctrine to the 
centre of (particularly U.S.) geopolitical strategy. On the one hand, this centres on the 
defence of everyday ‘critical’ urban infrastructures in the 'homeland' through improving its 
‘resilience’ to attack and manipulation (Kaplan, 2003). On the other, it involves the 
development of capabilities to systematically degrade, or at least control, the infrastructural 
connectivity, modernity, and geopolitical potential of the cities of the purported enemy,  
again, increasingly from afar. Such a strategy is, in essence: 
 "war in the most general possible sense; war that reaches into the tiniest 
details of daily life, reengineering the most basic arrangements of travel and 
communications in a  time when everyday life, in a mobile and 
interconnected society, is increasingly organised around these very 
arrangements" (Agre, 2001, 5). 
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 The problem with such strategies, of course, is that they implicitly push for a deepening 
militarisation of the all aspects of contemporary urban societies. War, in this broadest 
sense, suggests Phil Agre (2001) becomes a continuous, distanciated event, without 
geographical limits, that is relaid live, 24/7, on TV and the 'Net. Certainly, many political 
and military elites are currently perpetuating such discourses of endless, boundless war as 
part of the construction of post 9/11 states of emergency (Agamben, 2002). Dick Cheney, 
for example, has called this environment of continuous, distanciated attack, “the new 
normalcy”. The Bush Administration have used such reconceptualisations of political 
violence to justify their strategies of a massive securitisation and surveillance-surge for a 
‘homeland at war,’ combined with  murderous, pre-emptive assaults on the ‘evil’ zones 
deemed to be intrinsically ‘terroristic,’ or  in some way threatening to the new US imperial 
project. 
 
Hardt and Negri concur with such an analysis. In their 2004 book Multitude, they note that 
warfare is extending both metaphorically and practically to constitute the very core of 
contemporary societies. The invocation of everyday technics as military sites thus, helps to 
legitimise calls to states of emergency and exception, the deepening of national security 
controls, the post-9/11 surveillance ‘surge’, and the notion that continuous, pre-emptive 
and expeditionary wars must be waged  by the United States to safeguard the securitised  
cities of ‘homeland’ from the pervasive yet vague anxieties of permanent ‘terror’ (whilst 
also, ironically,  forcing adversarial societies to connect to predatory US capital as such 
societies are reengineered to sustain what David Harvey (2003) has called “accumulation 
by dispossession”). “War, in other words”, write Hardt and Negri (2004, 13),  “becomes the 
general matrix for all relations of power and techniques of dominantion, whether or not 
bloodshed is involved. War has become a regime of biopower, that is, a form of rule aimed 
not only at controlling the population but producing and reproducing all aspects of social 
life”. 
 
Our second conclusion is that the very real risk here is that the 'security' of network-based 
and urban societies against this new notion of war becomes such an overpowering 
obsession that it is used to legitimise a reengineering of the everyday systems that are 
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purportedly now so exposed to the endless, sourceless, boundless threat (Debrix, 2001). 
There is already considerable evidence to support Agamben's view that "security thus 
imposes itself of the basic principle of state activity" (2002, 1). He even argues that the 
imperative of 'security' is beginning to overwhelm other, historic functions of nation states 
that were built up over the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (such as social welfare, 
education, health, economic regulation, planning).  "What used to be one among several 
decisive measures of public administration until the first half of the twentieth century", 
suggests  Agamben, "now becomes the sole criterion of political legitimation" (2002, 1).  
And yet the very notion of genuinely securitising the millions of ‘soft’ targets that together 
constitute the fabric of cities is fanciful. Certainly, efforts need to be made to ensure that 
infrastructures and cities  are as ‘resilient’ as possible if faced with attacks (Vale and 
Campanella, 2004).  But reorganising cities and their infrastructures based on notions of 
absolute security would quickly have such devastating consequences on the very 
interactions  and flows that enable urban life to thrive in the first place that cities would 
soon become untenable.  
 
Our third conclusion is that, whilst the vulnerability of networked and cyborg cities, to 
forced disruption has been the central theme of this paper, we should not over simplify this 
point. Simply put, the neglect of political violence in urban studies, and the converse 
disregard of cities in studies of political violence, means that very little is actually known 
about how vulnerable cities and their networked infrastructures actually are to various 
forms of attack although see Vale and Campanella, 2004). We must remember that cities 
and their infrastructures are always being repaired (Thrift, 2004). Continuous improvisation 
is the very nature of the urban. And the continuous interruption of infrastructural flow is the 
normal experience for most urbanites (especially in the global south). So, whilst  we can 
not ignore the hundreds of thousands of premature dead who were killed by the ‘war on 
public health’ in Iraq, for example, similarly, we need to be careful not to over-generalize of 
exaggerate about the inevitable vulnerabilities of all networked systems in all cities.  Now 
should we underestimate the remarkable rates of recovery that cities demonstrate once 
better times emerge. “The processes at work during and after disasters are the same as 
those that account for concentrated social and economic development in less stressful 
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times”, writes Josef Konvitz. “Yet the myth of terrible urban vulnerability endures” (1990, 
62). 
 
Our final conclusion is that it is imperative that critical scholars of both cities and 
international relations/geopolitics address the intersections of infrastructural warfare and 
the forced demodernisation of urban societies with much more theoretical and empirical 
vigour than has thus been the case. As King and Martin suggest, "work in international 
relations in political science and related social science disciplines almost always ignores 
all but the most direct public health implications of military conflict" (2001, 2). The realities 
of 'war on public health,' and the geopolitics of state-backed efforts that ensure that entire 
societies endure the immiseration of what Agamben (1998) has called 'bare life,' tend to 
be ignored. This is because both media and analytical attention continuously turn to the 
formal violence, and immediate casualties, of the next war or the next sensationalised 
and media-hungry terrorist act.  The wider neglect of urban infrastructures in urban 
studies and critical urbanism tends to compound this neglect of infrastructural warfare 
(Graham and Marvin, 2001).   Together, these factors mean that, if urban studies and the 
wider social sciences are to keep up with war in Agre’s (2001) 'weirdly pervious world,' a 
sustained and interdisciplinary  engagement with the multi-scaled geopolitics of everyday 
technics and urban infrastructure is urgently required.  
 
40   Graham    Switching Cities Off 
 
Note 
 
The author would like to acknowledge the support of a British Academy Research 
readership, without which this paper could not have been written. Thanks also to Ash 
Amin, Phil Agre, Ryan Bishop, Neil Brenner, David Campbell and Bulent Dicken for the 
helpful comments on earlier drafts. Finally, thanks to the paper’s referees for their very 
useful suggestions. The usual disclaimers apply.  
 
References 
 
Agamben,  G. (1998), Homo Sacer : Sovereign Power and Bare Life, 
Stanford, Ca. : Stanford University Press. 
Agamben, G. (2002), “Security and terror,” Theory and Event, 5(4), 1-2. 
Agre, P. (2001), “Imagining the next war: Infrastructural warfare and the 
conditions of democracy,” Radical Urban Theory, 14th September 2001, 
available at www.rut.com/911/Phil-Agre.html (February 2004). 
Ashford  M. (2000), “Closing plenary speech,” IPPNW XIV World Congress, International 
Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, Available at 
www.ippnw.org/AshfordPlenary.html (February 2004). 
Barakat, S. (1998), “City war zones,” Urban Age, Spring, 11-19. 
Barnett, T. (2004), The Pentagon’s New Map: War and Peace in the 
Twenty-First Century,  New York: Putnam. 
Bauman, Z.  (2002), Reconnaissance wars and planetary frontierland", Theory, 
Culture and Society, 19(4), 81-90. 
Blakeley  R. (2003a), Bomb Now, Die Later. Bristol University : Department of 
Politics. Available at www.geocities.com/ruth_blakeley/bombnowdielater.htm, 
February 2004. 
Blakeley, R.  (2003b), “Targeting water treatment facilities,” Campaign Against Sanctions 
in Iraq, Discussion List, 24 January. Available at 
www.casi.org.uk/discuss/2003/msg00256.html (February 2004). 
41   Graham    Switching Cities Off 
 
Bolkcom, C. and Pike, J. (1993), Attack Aircraft Proliferation : Issues for Concern, 
Federation of American Scientists, Available at www.fas.org/spp/aircraft (February 2004). 
Borger, J. (1999), “NATO Commander Wesley Clarke boosts the case for telecom 
assaults with a  vision of how they might have been used in Kosovo,” Washington Post, 
November 5, 4. 
Carroll, B. (2001), Seeing Cyberspace : The Electrical Infrastructure is Architecture, 
Available at www.electronetwork/works/seeing/versions/html/images/htm (February 
2004). 
Castells, M. (1996) The Rise of the Network Society, Oxford and Malden 
MA: Blackwell. 
Church W. (2001), “Information warfare,” International  Review of the Red Cross, 
837, 205-216. 
Church, W. (2000), “Kosovo and the future of information operations.” Available 
at www.labournet/balkans/9906/io_ops.html (February 2004). 
Church, W. (2002), “Information  operations violates Protocol I,” Academia de 
Studii Economice din Moldova, Available at www.ase.md, (accessed February 
2004). 
De Landa, M. (1991), War in the Age of Intelligent Machines, New York : 
Zone. 
De Quallar, J. P. (1991), Report S/22366 to the United Nations Security Council, 
New York |: UN Office of the Iraq programme. 
Debrix, F.  (2001), “Cyberterror and media-induced fears : The production of 
emergency culture,” Strategies, 14(1), 149-167. 
Defense Intelligence Agency (1991), Iraq Water Treatment Vulnerabilities, 
Filename 511rept.91, Memo to Centcom, 18 January. 
Der Derian, J. (2003), “Network pathologies”, InfoTechWarPeace, Available at 
www.watsoninstitute.org/infopeace/911/index.cfm?id=15 (accessed 19 April 2005). 
Der Derian, J. (2001), Virtuous War : Mapping the Military-Industrial-Media-
Entertainment Complex, Boulder, Co. : Westview. 
Dillon, M. (2002), “Network society, network-centric warfare and the state of 
emergency,” Theory, Culture and Society, 19(4), 71-79. 
42   Graham    Switching Cities Off 
 
Dochterman (2002), “Shock and awe : Media, state, and techno-science in 
the war against Iraq,” Aporia Journal, available at 
http://aporiajournal.tripod.com/issues.html (February 2004). 
Eco, U. (2003), “Give peace a chance,” The Guardian Review, 1st February, 7. 
Enders,  D. (2003), “Getting back on the grid,” Baghdad Bulletin, 10th June 2003. 
Available at www.baghdadbulletin.com, February 2004. 
Felker,  E. (1998), Airpower, Chaos and Infrastructure : Lords of the Rings, U.S. 
Air War College Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, Maxwell paper 
14, July. 
Freniere, R. (2003), “Complexity-based targeting”, Air and Space Power Journal, Spring, 
12-34. 
Gandy, M. (2005), “Cyborg urbanization: Complexity and monstrosity in the contemporary 
city”, International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 29(1), 26-49. 
Graham, S. (2001) “In a moment : On glocal mobilities and the terrorised city,” 
City  5(3).  
Graham, S. (2003), “Lessons in Urbicide”, New Left Review, 19, Jan/Feb, 63-78. 
Graham, S. (2004a), Introduction : Cities, warfare, and states of emergency. In S. 
Graham (ed.), Cities, War and Terrorism : Towards an Urban Geopolitics, Oxford 
: Blackwell (forthcoming). 
Graham, S. and Marvin, S. (2001), Splintering Urbanism: Networked  
Infrastructure, Technological Mobilities and the Urban Condition, London: 
Routledge.  
Hardt, M. and Negri, A. (2000), Empire, Harvard : Harvard University Press. 
Hardt, M.and Negri A. (2004), Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of 
Empire, New York: Penguin. 
Harris, J. (2003), “Dreams of global hegemony and the technology of war,” Race 
and Class, 45(2), 54-67. 
Harvey, D. (2003), The New Imperialism, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Herod, A., Ó Tuathail, G. and Roberts, S. (eds). (1998),  Unruly World? 
Globalization, Governance, and Geography. London: Routledge. 
Hirst, P. (2001), War and Power in the 21st Century, Cambridge : Polity. 
43   Graham    Switching Cities Off 
 
Human Rights Watch, (2003), Off Target : The Conduct of the War and Civilian 
Casualties in Iraq, Washington DC. Available at www.hrw.org (February 2004). 
James, P. (2003), “The age of meta-war,” Arena Magazine, Issue 64, 4-8. 
Joy, W. (2000), “Why the future doesn't need us,” Wired, April, 238-260. 
Kaika, M.  and Swyngedouw, E. (2000), "Fetishising the modern city: The 
phantasmagoria of urban technological networks", International Journal of Urban 
and Regional Research , 24(1), 122-148. 
Kaplan, A. (2003), “Homeland insecurities : Reflections on language and 
space,” Radical History Review, 85, 82-93. 
Keaney, T. and Cohen, E. (1993), Gulf War Air Power Surveys (GWAPS), 
Washington DC ; Johns Hopkins university and the US Air Force. Available at 
www.au.af.mil/au/awcgate/awc-hist.htm+gulf (February 2004). 
Kelly, J. (1996), Air Force 2025, U.S. Air War College Air University, Maxwell Air 
Force Base, Alabama. 
King, G.  and Martin, G. (2001), The Human Costs of Military Conflict. Overview 
paper for September 29, 2001 conference on Military Conflict as a  Public Health 
Problem. 
Klein, N. (2001), “Poor services aid terrorists,” Guardian, October 26, 21. 
Klein, N. (2005), “Allure of the blank slate”, The Guardian, April 18, 17. 
Konvitz,  J. (1990), “Why cities don’t die”, American Heritage of Invention 
and Technology, Winter, 58-63. 
Kopp, C. (1996), The Electromagnetic Bomb : A Weapon of Mass Electrical 
Destruction, Military Library, Available at 
http://198.65.138.161/militarty/liv=braray/report/1996/apjemp.htm (Februuary 
2004). 
Lawson, M. (2000), “Mistaken attachment,” Guardian Weekly, 11-17, May, 11. 
Leslie, J. (1999), “Powerless,” Wired, April, 119-183. 
Liang, Q.  and Xiangsui,  W. (1999), Unrestricted Warfare, Beijing : PLA 
Literature and Arts Publishing House. 
Little, R. (2002), “Controlling cascading failure: Understanding the vulnerabilities 
of interconnected infrastructures,” Journal of Urban Technology, 9(1), 109-123. 
44   Graham    Switching Cities Off 
 
Lovinck, G. (1999), “War in the age of the Internet,”  Creative Room for Art and 
Computing, Available at www.crac.org/contexmapp/geert.htm (February, 2004). 
Luke, T. (2003a), “The co-existence of cyborgs, humachines and environments in 
Postmodernity: Getting over the end of nature.” In S. Graham (ed.), The Cybercities 
Reader, London : Routledge, 106-110. 
Luke, T. (2003b), Postmodern Geopolitics in the 21st century: Lessons from the 
9.11.01 Terrorist Attacks, Center for Unconventional Security Affairs, Occasional 
Paper, 2. 
Luke, T. (2004), “Power loss, gridlock, or blackout:  Revisiting the network 
collapses of 1965, 1977, 2000,  and 2003 in North America.” Abstract for a 
paper delivered at the conference on Urban Vulnerability and Network 
Failure: Construction And Experiences Of Emergencies, Crises And 
Collapse, 29-30th April, University Of Salford. 
Luke, T. and Ó Tuathail,  G. (1998), “The fraying modern map: Failed states and 
contraband capitalism,”  Geopolitics. 3 (3), 14-33.  
Miller, D. (2004), “The domination effect,” Guardian, 8th January, 24. 
Mueller, J. and Mueller, K, (1999), “Sanctions of mass destruction,” Foreign 
Affairs, 78(3), 43-53. 
Nagy, T.  (2001), “The secret behind the sanctions : How the U.S. Intentionally 
destroyed Iraq's water supply,” The Progressive, September, 1-6, available at 
www.progressive.org/0801issue/nagy0901.html (February 2004). 
Ó Tuathail, G. (1999),  Critical Geopolitics. Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press. 
Onley, D. (2003), “U.S. aims to make war on Iraq's networks,” Missouri 
Freedom of Information Center, available at 
http://foi.missouri.edu/terrorbkgd/usaimsmake.html (accessed February 
2004). 
Pape, R. (1996), Bombing to Win : Air Power and Coercion in War, Ithaca : 
cornell University Press. 
Patterson, C. (2000), Lights Out and Gridlock : The Impact of Urban 
Infrastructure Disruptions on Military Operations and Non-Combatants, 
45   Graham    Switching Cities Off 
 
Washington : Institute for Defense Analyses. 
Pawley, M. (1997), Terminal Architecture, London : Reaktion. 
Pax, S. (2003), “Baghdad Blogger,” 13th August 2003, Guardian 2, 4. 
Perry,  D. (1995), “Introduction.” In D. Perry,   (1995), Building the Public 
City: The Politics, Governance and Finance of Public Infrastructure, 
London: Sage. 1-20. 
Pineiro , R. (2004), Cyberterror , New York : Tor. 
Project for the New American Century, (2000), Rebuilding Americas 
Defenses, Washington. 
Rattray, G. (2001), Strategic Warfare in Cyberspace, MIT Press : Cambridge, 
Ma.  
Rinaldi, S. (1995), Beyond the Industrial Web: Economic Synergies and 
Targeting Methodologies, Maxwell, Alabama: Air University Press. 
Rizer, K. (2001), “Bombing dual-use targets : Legal, ethical, and doctrinal 
perspectives,” Air and Space Power Chronicles,  5th January, available at 
www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/cc/Rizer.html (February 2004). 
Rochlin, G. (1997), Trapped in the Net : The Unanticipated Consequences of 
Computerization, New Jersey: Princeton. 
Rochlin, G. (2002), “Networks and the subversion of choice : An institutionalist 
manifesto,” Journal of Urban Technology, 9(1), 124-145. 
Rowat, C. (2003), “Iraq  Potential consequences of war,” Campaign Against 
Sanctions in Iraq Discussion List, 8 November, available at 
www.casi.org.uk/discuss/2002/msg02025.html (February 2004). 
Saunders, G. (2000), “ Washington uses massive bombing to show the world 
who's boss,” www.laborstandard.org, 193) (available at February 2004). 
Seffers, G. (1998), “Joint Chiefs inaugurate information combat era,” Defense 
News, November 9-15, 1-4. 
Skoric, I. (1999), “On not killing civilians,” posted at amsterdam.nettime.org, 6 
May. 
Smith, C. (2003), “U.S. wrestles with new weapons,” NewsMax.Com, March 
13th, available at ww.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2003/3/134712.shtml, 
46   Graham    Switching Cities Off 
 
(February 2004).  
Smith, T. (2002), “The new law of war : Legitimizing hi-tech  and infrastructural violence,” 
International Studies Quarterly, 46, 355-374. 
Spiller, R. (2000), Sharp Corners : Urban Operations at Century's End, Fort 
Leavonsworth, Ka. Staff College Press. 
Star, S. (1999), “The ethnography of infrastructure”, American Behavioral 
Scientist, 43(3), 377-391. 
Steblin, M. (1997), Targeting for Effect: Is There an Iceberg Ahead?, Maxell Air 
Force Base: Air University Press. 
Stone, P. (2000), “Space command plans for computer network attack mission,” 
U.S. Department of Defense : Defense Link, 14 January, available at 
www.defenselink.mil (February 2004). 
Tahoub, T. (2003), “The war on al-Jazeera,”  Guardian, 4th October, 23. 
Thrift, N and French, S (2002), “The automatic production of space,” 
Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, 27(4) 309-35. 
Thrift, N. (2004), “But malice aftorethought: Cities and the natural history of 
hatred”. Mimeo. 
United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)(1999), Annex II of S/1999/356, Section 
18. Available at www.un.org/Depts/oip/reports, February 2004) 
United States Air Force (1998), Strategic Attack : Air Force Doctrine Document 2-
1.2, 20 May, Washington DC. 
US Department of Defense, (2000), Joint Vision 2020, Washington DC. 
Vale, L.  and Campanella,  T. (2004), The Resilient City: How Modern Cities 
Recover From Disaster, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Verton, D. (2003), Black Ice : The Invisible Threat of Cyberterrorism,  New York : 
Osborne McGraw Hill. 
Virilio,  P. (2002), Desert Screen : War at the Speed of Light, London : 
Continuum. 
Virilio, P. (2000), “The Kosovo war took place in orbital space,” C-Theory, Article 
89, available at www.concordia.ca, February 2004. 
Warden, J. (1995), “The enemy as a system,” Airpower Journal, 9 (1), 41-55. 
47   Graham    Switching Cities Off 
 
Warden, J. (1996), “Air theory for the twenty-first century”. In Battlefield of the 
Future: 21st Century Warfare Issues, Maxwell Airforce Base; Air University, 
Chapter 4, available at 
http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/battle/bftoc.html (February 
2005). 
Wilson, J. (2003),  Computer Attacks and Cyber Terrorism : Vulnerabilities and 
Policy Issues for Congress, Congressional Research Service, The Library of 
Congress, CRS report for Congress, October 17th, Order Code 
RL32114.January, 1-3. 
Wilson, J. (2003),  Computer Attacks and Cyber Terrorism : Vulnerabilities and 
Policy Issues for Congress, Congressional research Service, The Library of 
Congress, CRS report for Congress, October 17th, Order Code 
RL32114.January, 1-3. 
Zimmerman, R. (2001), “Social implications of infrastructure network 
interactions,” Journal of Urban Technology, 8(3), 97-119. 
 
 
